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Abstract 
 
In this paper, it will be argued that unanimous agreement as the 
ultimate criterion of goodness in constitutional political economy 
corresponds better with the analysis of the firm than it does with the 
analysis of much larger organisations, such as nation states. The aim of 
the paper is also to argue that conventions play a central role in the 
attainment of a social contract. Conventions enter the explanation in two 
ways. Firstly, they are logically prior to agreement, and secondly, as it is 
argued here, it is convention that carries behavioural influence through 
ongoing, collective interpretative effort, rather than the agreed explicit 
rule itself. A social contract upon a rule is here seen as the outcome of 
the process by which shared expectations emerge and change. 
Furthermore, as soon as a rule is agreed upon, it is the collective process 
by which the rule’s meaning is reinterpreted in future unforeseen 
situations that explains behavioural constraints, not the rule as a principle 
itself. The paper also connects the present approach to other theories of 
the firm. 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper argues that contractarian reasoning can contribute to 
new institutional theories of the firm by emphasising the procedural 
justification of the constraints within which actors make choices among 
alternatives. Normative individualism as the methodology of 
constitutional economics brings along logical constraints to efficiency 
considerations that new institutional theories are largely silent about. A 
central difference between constitutional economics and the new 
institutional theories of the firm is that while the latter focus mainly on 
efficient outcomes within a given institutional framework, the former 
examines the criteria by which the institutional framework itself can be 
considered efficient.  
The paper will maintain that taking voluntary exchange as the ultimate 
source of justification in constitutional economics is problematic. This is 
because the boundary between voluntariness and coercion depends on 
conventions of property and fairness which define how voluntary 
exchange is arrived in the first place. I will argue that by limiting 
efficiency consideration to voluntary exchange alone breaks with the 
constitutional procedural justification producing logical inconsistency. I 
will propose that cutting the infinite regress of the procedural 
justification of rules should not be done before conventions have been 
incorporated into the justification process.  
The firm can be seen to be constituted by a group of self-
interested people cooperating and competing within a set of multi-
layered rules. Individual decisions and actions are interrelated and 
coordinated in ways that allow us to refer to corporate (Coleman 1990) or 
concerted (Vanberg 1992) action. The contribution of the constitutional 
approach is that it highlights the (explicit or implicit) constitutional 
agreement as an exchange of commitments (Vanberg 1994, 140). The 
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contracting parties benefit from constraining their future choices within 
the constitutional framework. The core argument of the constitutional 
theory the firm is that an organisational social contract results in 
relations among the parties that are different in kind from market 
relations (see an opposing view in Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  
There are not many theorists who have analysed the firm from the 
contractarian perspective. Vanberg (1992) has provided a persuasive 
analysis on how the constitutional paradigm can provide a consistent 
individualist interpretation of organisations as acting units. His approach 
is linked with Coleman’s (1990) analytical perspective on the procedural 
foundations of collective action. Gifford’s (1991) constitutional analysis 
of the firm argues that the firm will benefit if relation-specific 
investments can be secured through the owner’s attempt to purposefully 
design an efficient constitution. Wolff (1997) recognises that corporate 
culture, as in Kreps (1990), can be taken as an implicit part of the 
constitution of a firm. Langlois (1995) discusses the interplay between 
constructed and spontaneous elements in the emergence and 
perseverance of firms.    
Figure 1 illustrates the goal of this paper. The contributions of 
Coleman, Vanberg and Gifford are depicted as the area A, providing a 
constitutional approach to the firm. My aim is to justify the introduction 
of conventions into the contractarian perspective (area B), and to 
propose that taking into account the interplay between evolution and 
design can aid our understanding of many aspects of the firm (area C).  
 
The extended constitutional approach may have some interesting 
connections with other theories of the firm. I propose that it can be 
viewed as an overarching perspective that can encompass many existing 
insights into the theory of the firm. It can provide further explanations 
on the resolution of coordination and motivation problems within 
organisations, emphasised by the modern contract theory (cf. Milgrom 
and Roberts 1992). Matters such as the feasibility of incomplete 
contracting, or why participants are willing to constrain their rent-
seeking and opportunistic tendencies in relations characterised by asset 
specificity and asymmetric information, receive explanation that 
complement transaction cost and other contract theories. Corporate 
culture has a close connection to the present theme and will be discussed 
in connection to constitutional reasoning.  
Constitutional
Perspective
Theory of
the Firm
Evolutionary
Perspective
A
B
C
Figure 1: Connecting themes
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will provide some 
basic principles of constitutional economics. It will also initiate the 
rationale for directing constitutional analysis to the theory of the firm. 
Section 3 aims to explain the rationale for introducing conventions into 
contractarian reasoning. In section 4 I turn to examine the constitutional 
theory of the firm. The discussion is limited to the contributions that are 
closely related to the contractarian reasoning provided by Buchanan and 
other advocates of constitutional political economy. The reason for this 
limitation is based on the recognition that the term constitution may be 
used in various ways that do not have to correspond with contractarian 
philosophy. In section 5 I will examine the extended constitutional 
perspective further in relation to other theories of the firm. Finally, 
section 6 will provide some concluding remarks.  
 
On the basic principles of constitutional economics 
 
Constitutional economics is essentially about the examination and 
evaluation of the foundational rules of social order. It is an inquiry into 
the interrelation between what Hayek called the order of rules and the order 
of actions (Hayek 1973). The constitutional perspective suggests that in 
our pursuit for social improvement, changes in the order of rules ought 
to be the principal means (Vanberg 1994, 5). It directs our analytical 
attention toward the choice among constraints (Buchanan 1991, 5). This 
perspective implies the recognition that societies are complex systems 
where purposeful design directed to particular outcomes does not in 
many cases bring about what is desired. This results from the genuine 
uncertainty of outcomes. The source of uncertainty is our ignorance of 
the unintended consequences inherent in human (inter)action. Although 
an organisation can be viewed as being intentionally constructed to 
realise a certain purpose, the actions taken within the organisation have 
unintended consequences as well. This relates to Hayek’s view on the 
relation between the origin of rules and their outcomes as he states that 
‘it is possible that an order which would still have to be described as 
spontaneous rests on rules which are entirely the result of deliberate 
design’ (Hayek 1973, 46). What is meant by the notion of purpose 
becomes central. If by purpose it is referred to rather concrete ends, it is 
consistent to view the goal of an organisation as an outcome of 
purposeful design. This, however, leaves open the question to what 
extent the attainment of that goal can be viewed as a planned process. 
Alternatively, if one views purpose as being directed towards more 
abstract ends such as self-maintenance or survival (cf. Selznick 1948), the 
purpose seems to owe more to spontaneous elements.  
The constitutional perspective directs the analytical interest from 
the goal-oriented discussion to the foundations of agreement on 
participatory and distributional rules. The firm is then not defined 
through its possible goals, but through the rules that constitute a system 
of productive relations among the participants. The constitution of an 
organisation specifies the terms of participation: (1) which resources 
participants are to contribute to the organisation, (2) how and by whom 
the decisions on the use of pooled resources are to be made, and (3) how 
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the resulting benefits from the joint endeavour are to be shared among 
participants (Vanberg 1985, 22).  
Constitutional analysis is consistently individualistic. (1) The 
derivation of institutional constraints is based on a calculus of individual 
interests. (2) Collective choice is derived from the participatory 
behaviour of individual members. (3) Emphasis is directed to the 
selection of rules that will limit the behaviour of those who operate 
within them (Buchanan 1991, 8). 
The methodology of normative individualism provides a normative 
point of departure for constitutional economics advocated by Buchanan 
and other contractarians. Normative individualism suggests that we 
should take the values and interests of the individuals involved as the 
relevant standard against which the goodness of rules and their 
outcomes is to be judged (Vanberg 1994, 1).  
The constitutional perspective highlights voluntary exchange as the 
core motivator for the individual to limit her behaviour within 
constraints. The cost of limiting one's own behaviour is accepted insofar 
as it does not exceed the benefit resulted from reciprocal behaviour of 
others. This perspective emphasises the calculative rationality of the 
individual who actively chooses her own constraints. By definition, a 
voluntary exchange happens only when the participants expect to gain 
from the trade.  
The subjectivist position of the constitutional perspective 
recognises that values and theories about the world vary across 
individuals. This limits efficiency considerations because it is believed 
that no supraindividual scalar of goodness exists. There is no reason to 
believe that the ordering of preferences would not vary in time and 
across individuals.  
From the subjectivist position, an assessment of efficiency relies 
on revealed preferences of the individual. When the idea of voluntary 
exchange is transferred to the realm of collective choice, the strict 
criterion of revealed preferences through observed exchange needs to 
encompass all the parties. As the subjectivist position holds that the 
values of individuals are incommensurable, an exclusion of any one party 
from the exchange breaks down the possibility to verify that the 
observed exchange was in fact efficient.  
Since individuals vary in their tastes and interests, it is likely that 
when a group of people get together in order to pursue something 
collectively, conflicts of interests arise and mutual agreement may thus 
be difficult to achieve. The members need to compromise before a 
mutually agreed solution can be reached. The solution may not match 
perfectly with anybody’s immediate interests but provides a more 
desirable outcome than being without it. The question about how to 
facilitate a compromise thus becomes central. A compromise requires 
the parties, to some extent, to alienate their immediate self-interests and, 
through introspection, assess what would be considered fair by the other 
parties.  
The constitutional bargaining process itself contains aspects that 
facilitate agreement (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, 29). Rules are by 
definition more general than the outcomes that result from action guided 
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by those rules. A constitutional choice among alternative rules contains 
the elements of generality as a chosen rule needs to be applicable in 
numerous contingencies. Another basic characteristic of a rule is its 
extended time dimension. A rule needs to be applied over time, 
otherwise it can hardly be considered a rule. Due to these considerations, 
the individual faces genuine uncertainty about how her position will be 
affected by the operation of a particular rule. Insofar as mutual 
agreement is the goal, the individual tends to agree on arrangements that 
can be considered fair in the sense that they are broadly acceptable (ibid., 
30).  
For a contractarian, the only justified criterion of goodness in 
collective choices is a unanimous agreement among the participants. 
Alternative constitutional arrangements can be analysed in a hypothetical 
initial state to discover what basic principles such rules should fulfil. This 
may help her to create new alternatives that may receive acceptance 
among the relevant group. But, as Buchanan has recurrently noted, the 
members of the group are the sovereign decision-makers whose 
individual values are the only justified source for efficiency 
considerations. What makes this central principle problematic is its 
consequence on innovative and creative aspects of social endeavour. It is 
obvious that many innovations are such that only few understand their 
potential value immediately. Changes in rules are especially difficult to 
negotiate because individuals generally value the status quo (Schlicht 
1998). Another problem that Barry (1984) has pointed out arises as all 
the members are in a position to veto an alternative that would otherwise 
be desirable. From the contractarian position, there is of course no such 
a thing as ‘otherwise desirable’, but it is intuitive to think that somebody 
may want to veto whatever the rest of the group are suggesting. This 
connects to the pragmatic criteria of justifiable exclusion from decision-
making (children, mentally challenged, etc.). Any agreement on the 
contents of such a list fails by necessity to meet the contractarian ideal, 
however. This is because the exclusion must occur before the list is 
agreed upon.  
Contractarians have tried to resolve this problem by proposing 
that not all choices among rules need to satisfy the strict criterion of 
unanimity. It is entirely justifiable for any group to unanimously agree 
upon relaxing the criterion for post-constitutional rules that are specific 
to the extent that a complete agreement would be too costly to achieve 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962). This makes the perspective more 
operational but also creates a logical problem. If post-constitutional rules 
may be placed in categories of various degrees of unanimity (simple 
majority, two-thirds, three-fifths, etc), then a choice of which category to 
use regarding a particular post-constitutional rule becomes central. If a 
choice about the proper category of a rule is less than unanimous, then 
the choice itself becomes unjustified on constitutional grounds. The 
participants know that the higher the degree of unanimity that is 
required, the less probable it is for a rule to become accepted. Thus, 
those who favour a certain post-constitutional rule try to get it into a 
category with a low degree of unanimity, whereas those who oppose it 
try to get it into the category of the highest level of unanimity. 
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Therefore, if such a choice itself is not unanimous, there is no guarantee 
that any post-constitutional rule is efficient.  
These problems concerning the strict unanimity criterion can be 
attempted to be remedied by three ways. The first alternative is to relax 
the strict unanimity requirement and accept a more operational 
alternative that takes unanimity as an ideal. The goodness of a collective 
choice is then measured by its degree of unanimity. The problem with this 
alternative is that it opens the door for the Kaldor-Hicks type reasoning 
by which a change in rules would be acceptable insofar as the benefit 
would over-compensate the loss and those who win could hypothetically 
compensate those who lose. The contractarian position maintains that in 
such a situation the compensation should be observed, otherwise no 
guarantee of mutual benefit is provided. This argument is logically 
problematic, however. If the participants perceive and calculate the 
compensation, there is no reason for them not to agree. The result then 
would be unanimous agreement. If, on the other hand, the participants 
do not perceive the compensation as a part of their gain in exchange 
(perhaps due to ignorance), the normative individualistic principle of the 
contractarian position does not allow an agency to ‘know better’ what is 
good for the participants, and thus the change in rules would remain 
coercive. To be sure, the idea that a change in rules is justifiable in 
contractarian terms insofar losers are compensated is unhelpful as it 
directs attention to outcomes that are nonexistent at the moment of choice. 
After all, in contractarian reasoning, efficiency of a collective choice is 
not derived from ex post outcomes but, instead, from the exchange at the 
moment of collective choice.  
The second alternative to remedy problems arising from the strict 
criterion of unanimity is to limit the applicability of the contractarian 
reasoning to rules that are general enough so as to facilitate agreement 
behind the veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971) or of uncertainty (Brennan 
and Buchanan 1985). It is likely that general principles of human rights, 
separate property, and government may be shared in a large group. The 
problem with general principles is that in order for them to carry 
behavioural influence, they need to be interpreted in dissimilar situations. 
Even though an agreement on general principles may be reached, 
unanimity on rules that define more accurately the scopes and limits of 
various (often conflicting) rights may remain unattainable, as the 
participants are able to foresee how a certain configuration will affect 
their relative positions.  
The third alternative to remedy problems arising from the 
unanimity criterion is to direct contractarian reasoning to smaller groups 
whose members may share more coherent sets of values. This idea is 
based on the assumption that the more coherent the values among the 
participants are, the more detailed rules the participants can agree upon. 
Another central assumption is that in smaller groups the probability of 
more coherent values is higher than in larger groups. If these 
assumptions prove to be realistic, contractarian reasoning is perhaps 
more applicable in smaller organisations, such as business firms, than at 
the level of nation states.  
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The rest of this paper aims to examine this third alternative. 
However, even though agreement on more detailed rules may generally 
be better facilitated in smaller groups, I shall maintain that the exchange 
of commitments among the participants depends on the conventions of 
fairness and reciprocity in that group. This view is closely related to 
Sugden’s interpretation of contractarianism in which ‘the object is to 
evaluate possible changes in the institutions of an existing society, using 
a criterion of agreement that is defined relative to the knowledge and the 
conventions that prevail in that society’ (1993, 421, emphasis added).  
 
Enter conventions 
 
In the approach proposed here, conventions enter the 
constitutional analysis in two distinguishable ways. First, it is maintained 
that from a structural perspective conventions logically precede a social 
contract. Second, it is argued that a social contract upon a rule does not 
per se produce coordination of actions and expectations. A rule needs to 
be continuously reinterpreted as the future is disclosed. It is the ongoing 
interpretative effort that produces shared expectations of appropriate 
courses of action.  
The term 'convention' is here broadly defined as a social pattern of 
behaviour which is shared among the participants to the degree that it is 
common knowledge that most participants conform to the pattern and 
that most participants expect most of the others to conform as well. 
Conventions can be contractual and noncontractual. A noncontractual 
convention is one which does not require a covenant to enforce 
conformity because it is in the direct interests of everyone to conform; 
and there is no need for explicit agreement as it is obvious to all parties 
what the expectations of others are. A convention, such as on which side 
of the road to drive, is thus noncontractual in the sense that no contract 
needs to be established for its maintenance (Gauthier 1998). A 
convention is contractual if its maintenance requires an agreement and a 
covenant to enforce the agreement. For instance, a rule by which a firm’s 
outcome is to be distributed among the participants is contractual. 
As a first approximation, the term contractual convention might 
be used interchangeably with the term social contract. They both require 
agreement. The distinction between a social contract and a convention 
can be seen in their dissimilar relation to time and process. The 
constitutional position emphasises a two-step notion of rules: before a 
game can begin, rules must be agreed upon. In the second step, the game 
is carried out within the agreed rules (Buchanan 1991). This leaves open 
the question about how those rules are to be interpreted in disclosing 
future situations that are necessarily nonexistent at the moment of rule 
making, and also, how interpretation modifies the rules themselves. A 
social contract can, of course, be seen as conjectural in the sense that the 
disclosing future can be expected to provide feedback so as to motivate 
the participants to revise the contract to better correspond with changed 
circumstances (Vanberg 1986). However, the way participants come to 
recognise a decrease in the desirability of the present rule is argued here 
to be due to a recognised discrepancy between the de facto convention 
 8 
that is adhered to and the rule that was agreed upon in the past. It is 
unrealistic to assume that the participants collectively and simultaneously 
suddenly realise the presence of a discrepancy that they had all failed to 
recognise earlier.  
Thus, it is argued here, it is the shared interpretation of rules that 
influence behaviour, not the agreed rule itself. Such a collective 
interpretative effort has more to do with convention formation and 
change than with the rule as an outcome of collective choice. Even 
though this argument may sound somewhat strange, consider the 
following logic. The explicitly agreed rule itself is a principle that has been 
arrived at through collective interpretation. I argue that the interpretative 
process by which the principle is arrived at is more important than the 
principle itself. This is because what explains the agreement upon a rule 
is not the rule itself, but the collective interpretative effort that gives rise 
to agreement. Another reason for this argument is not derived from the 
process by which an agreement is arrived at, but from the process of 
interpretation that begins immediately after the rule is in place. After an 
agreement upon a rule, interpretation upon its meaning begins to have its 
influence. Viewed this way the explicitly agreed rule itself serves as a 
discontinuation point in the processes that both create it and interpret its 
meaning.  
The first argument for the structural priority of conventions over a 
social contract, as presented in the beginning of this section, is derived 
from the logical problem that would result if no convention were 
assumed to exist at the moment of agreement. As Block and DiLorenzo 
put it:  
 
Constitutional economists try to derive a theory of human and 
property rights from their constitutional framework and they seek to 
do so on a consensual basis. But how can people give their consent 
to a contract before it is clear that they have any rights to do so? 
Where do these rights come from? How can a person agree to be 
bound by a constitution if it is this very document which can alone 
establish his rights? If rights are established only by constitutions, 
then before their advent individuals have no rights. But if they have 
no rights, what "right" do they have to participate in the construction 
of a constitution? (Block and DiLorenzo 2000, 571) 
 
Taking an agreement as the starting point is logically problematic 
because if the initial state does not already include some mutual 
expectations, that is, a convention of reciprocity, a social contract 
remains unattainable. This refers to Hobbes’ (1996) model of the initial 
state. In that model, the participants cannot resolve the first-mover 
paradox because in a genuine anarchy, reputation accumulation is 
impossible. In order for a protective agency to arise, the model must be 
extended to comprise at least bilateral reciprocity in a way presented by 
Nozick (1974). The reason why I use the term bilateral reciprocity rather 
than exchange is that although there is exchange, it is not temporally 
symmetric in the sense that all exchanging parties receive gains at the 
moment of exchange. They receive expectations of gains that require the 
keeping of promises and trust.  
The contractarian position is maintained to be able to 
systematically extend the individualistic perspective of classical liberalism 
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into the realm of collective choice (Vanberg 1994, 204). The 
individualistic position maintains that voluntary exchange indicates 
agreement among the parties, and that such voluntary agreement is the 
ultimate criterion on which an exchange can be judged to be efficient 
(Buchanan 1977, 128). In direct analogy, the contractarian individualistic 
position maintains that a collective choice can only be judged efficient if 
it is based on voluntary agreement by all parties involved (Vanberg 1994, 
204). This paper maintains that the way voluntariness is defined in 
particular situations depends on the relevant conventions among the 
participants.  
 
The constitutional theory of the firm 
 
Firms, like other organisations (clubs, associations, states, etc.), are 
constituted by their members. By entering into an organisation a 
member becomes subject to the authority system of that organisation. 
An individual voluntarily gives up some of her autonomy in return for 
the benefit she gains from participation. When entering an organisation 
the individual not only accepts the authority system, but is also willing to 
submit part of her resources to be pooled and subjected to unitary 
control. It is through the exercise of control over the pooled resources 
that an organisation can meaningfully be treated as an acting unit. The 
constitution of a business firm states the terms of membership as well as 
the member’s rights of participation in controlling the combined 
resources. (Vanberg and Buchanan 1986, 216). Many desirable aspects in 
the firm dynamics depend on the success of coordinating efforts among 
the members and on the ways that rights are defined and justified. 
Capability accumulation, knowledge creation and dissemination, 
communication and coordination of plans and actions are examples of 
such aspects. It seems reasonable that we should direct our analytical 
interests toward the constitutional dynamics of firms when long-term 
developmental issues are studied.  
The constitutional rules of an organisation can be described as 
solving two types of problems: those arising (1) in team use of pooled 
resources and those arising (2) when the social product of collective 
endeavour is distributed among the members (Vanberg 1994, 139). The 
former type of problems refer to knowledge problems of how to arrange 
and coordinate various tasks within the organisation. The latter type of 
problems seem to correspond better with the conflictual aspects of self-
interested members. The central criterion for agreement is that a rule 
needs to be general enough to facilitate impartial judgement. Rules of 
distribution do not necessarily provide uncertainty to the extent that the 
members could not foresee how their positions would be affected. With 
regard to privately owned business firms, an equal-share rule is not more 
prominent than any other alternative. One solution to alleviate conflicts 
of interests in distribution is to examine how far property rights can be 
developed to provide prominent demarcation in collective endeavour.   
It appears intuitively obvious that if the property rights within a 
firm are ill-defined or ill-protected, the members suffer through reduced 
incentives to put an effort and increased incentives to rent-seeking. 
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Gifford is in line with other asset specificity theorists when he recognises 
that the core problem arises when it would be in the interest of the firm 
to have the members making firm-specific investments (1991, 91). If 
property rights are ill-protected, members remain vulnerable to rent-
seeking on the part of others and thus remain reluctant to make such 
investments. The constitution of a firm is then viewed as a remedy for 
this undesirable state of affairs. The constitution is seen as a set of 
interdependent long-term contracts among the members (ibid., 92).  
The role of the constitution, for Gifford, is to ‘set up a system of 
constraints, limiting the ability of individuals and coalitions to impose 
external costs on others’ (1991, 92). A constitution is thus designed 
primarily for limiting opportunism within organisations. For Gifford, the 
remedy for rent-seeking tendencies is a constitution created by the owner 
(or her agent) ‘to maximize the sum of the present values of all the assets 
used in the firm’ (1991, 93). The central purpose for the owner to set up 
constitutional constraints is to provide incentives for the employees to 
make firm-specific investments. This is accomplished by protecting the 
property rights of the employees to their firm-specific investments. ‘By 
creating an efficient constitution the owner of the firm maximises the 
value of his own assets in the firm and at the same time those of the 
other firm members’ (ibid.). The positive externalities that the owner 
thus creates are internalised by other firm members. This can partly 
explain the motivation for an individual to join a firm. A member can 
gain access to the pool of knowledge and is at the same time protected 
by the constitutional rules against potential rent-seeking by other 
members.  
Furubotn (1988) is in the same line of reasoning as Gifford. With 
codetermination, Furubotn means a provision of control rights that give 
those employees who make firm-specific investments part of the firms’ 
control rights. The decisive criterion is whether or not representatives of 
labour take part in the firm’s decision-making processes at board level 
(ibid., 166). The core idea of the article is to explain that the firm 
maximises its profits by giving those employees who make firm-specific 
investments their share of decision-making rights. Furubotn maintains 
that the firm is actually a ‘joint investment’ among capital and labour 
providers and therefore the employee-investors should be regarded as 
equity holders (ibid., 168). The sharing of control rights via 
codetermination is then maintained to provide some assurance that ‘all 
interests will be considered in decision making and that unfair allocation 
of quasi rents will be prevented’ (ibid., 168-9, emphasis in original).  
Furubotn’s analysis remains noncontractarian in its emphasis on 
the profit maximisation rationale for joint decision-making. To be sure, if 
profit maximisation is the rationale for joint decision-making, then we 
have to consider the trade-off between increased decision-making costs 
on the one side, and the increased coherence between the rules and the 
interests of the participants on the other side (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962). Such an assessment is necessarily directed towards consequences 
that are nonexistent at the moment of choice, and therefore remains 
speculative.  
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Gifford’s analysis recognises the central rationale for a constitution 
as constraining the self-interested behaviour of the firm members. 
However, his analysis remains somewhat distant to the normative 
individualist foundation of constitutional economics. The idea that a 
central agent should (be able to) design an efficient constitution for the 
members of the firm to follow seems to disregard core issues in the 
procedural justification of contractarian reasoning - as well as the 
epistemic limitations of human actors. The unanimity criterion in 
constitutional economics is established precisely because of the problem 
that we cannot know whether a collective choice is efficient or not in any 
other means than by assessing the degree to which it corresponds with 
the interests of the relevant parties.  
 
Connections to other theories of the firm 
 
A common denominator for theories of the firm is that they are 
characterised by their concern with the existence, the boundaries and the 
internal organisation of the firm. Another common theme is that 
explanations for these matters are based on outcome-oriented efficiency 
considerations. The goal of the present approach is different. It discusses 
some foundational principles of a constitutional order within the 
business firm. The constitutional approach advocated here corresponds 
with the principles of subjectivism which give limited scope to derive 
efficiency claims. The present paper is thus unable to assess to what 
extent constitutional rules of an economic organisation are efficient in 
some other sense than being desirable, judged by the members 
themselves.  
The literature on the theory of the firm is expanding and it would 
be futile to try to discuss all various approaches in this context, especially 
in a way that would give any more light to the matters than has already 
been given by others (for a detailed discussion on various contributions 
see Foss, 1999). In this section, I will discuss some ideas from different 
approaches that are connected with the main theme of the paper.  
The issues connected with the constitutional perspective that are 
of interest here concern the contractual arrangements within the firm. 
Interesting issues arise from coordination problems as well as incentive-
conflicts among the members. Transaction-cost considerations 
correspond with our immediate intuition as well. An economising 
individual will prefer more goods to less and less bads to more. It is 
therefore expected that people will try to organise production in ways 
that minimise various types of costs that necessarily arise from action. It 
is another thing to what extent lists of different kinds of costs take into 
account all relevant costs, or whether all those costs that influence 
choice behaviour can even in principle be made operational (cf. 
Buchanan 1969). Be that as it may, various approaches contribute to our 
understanding about the dynamics of economic organisations, a subject 
which is continuously changing as new, hitherto unperceived 
organisational arrangements are being created.  
A constitution of a nation state applies to every member of that 
nation, even the legal-political elite (this is at least the general ideal of it). 
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Things are not the same within business organisations, however. Power 
relations emerge not only through political processes within firms but are 
also part of the legal statuses of the members. Owners and managers 
have, in part, different sets of legal rights and obligations than 
employees. Therefore, constitutional considerations within economic 
organisations differ from those at the national level.  
Coleman has introduced useful terms that recognise these 
important distinctions. A constitution is conjoint when the beneficiaries 
and the targets are the same persons (1990, 327). A constitution of a 
Western nation is a good example of this. Although not every member 
of the nation participates to the same degree in the process of 
establishing the constitution, those who are targets, i.e., those who are 
constrained by the constitutional rules, and those who benefit from 
having a constitution are the same persons. Every member faces both 
costs and benefits from constitutional constraints. Cost incurs as the 
individual has to constrain her own action within the limits of the shared 
rules. Beneficial impact comes from others’ similarly constrained 
behaviour.  
A constitution is disjoint when the beneficiaries and the targets are 
not the same persons. As an extreme, those who benefit from certain 
rules may be completely different individuals than those who are 
subjected to those rules. An owner-manager of a firm may design a set of 
rules that constrains the actions of her subordinates but which do not 
concern herself. It is sensible to argue that economic organisations 
represent constitutions that have more disjoint characteristics than what 
can be found at the national level. As a first approximation, this could 
imply that business firms are characterised by more arbitrary rules than 
nations, and that subordinates within firms are subject to more coercive 
rules than their superiors.  
 
Exit and efficiency 
 
Markets in which business firms are embedded provide prominent 
resolution mechanisms to the potential coercion of firms’ constitutional 
arrangements. It is reasonable to argue that employees have better 
opportunities to vote by their feet, that is, to withdraw from a firm that 
enforces unjust rules, compared to emigrating from a nation state 
(Hirshman 1970, Wolff 1997). This fact alleviates the potential coercion 
within disjoint constitutions. Also, an employee’s ongoing participation 
in a firm is taken as an implicit consent to the firm’s constitution. Although 
exit is more operational when examining economic organisations, than 
when discussing entire societies, it is not entirely unspeculative regarding 
economic organisations.  
Exit indicates that the participant is not satisfied with the present 
constitutional order, or, that a better alternative has been found. This 
may lead to a logical problem in the constitutional approach. Continued 
participation is assumed to reveal interest to accept the organisational 
constitution. On the other hand, the normative individualistic 
foundation does not permit efficiency considerations other than those 
based on observed exchange. This means that when we observe two 
 13 
consecutive exchanges by the same actor, we cannot assess their 
comparative goodness based on procedural justification. This is because 
an observed exchange does not contain information about its relative 
efficiency regarding other observed exchanges (cf. Buchanan 1969, 
Lachmann 1976). What this implies in the context where a member of a 
firm decides to change the employer is that both having stayed in the 
present company and entering into the new one enjoy equal procedural 
efficiency. An attempt to argue that the exit is due to unsatisfactory 
constitutional order is inconsistent with the procedural criterion of 
goodness of constitutional economics.  
Constitutional economists probably accept the idea that each 
agreement is conjectural in the sense that it may become changed as 
circumstances call for it. Although one can argue that the change occurs 
because the old rule has become inefficient in the sense that the 
members do not perceive it advantageous any more, one cannot argue 
that one somehow knows the comparative efficiency of the new rule 
over the old rule when it was chosen. This issue is central to how we 
perceive the change in rules and thus cultural evolution. What I am 
arguing here is that, based on our limited reason and imperfect 
knowledge, insofar as two consecutive choices are based on voluntary 
exchange there is no secure way for us to measure their comparative 
efficiency. Consider two consecutive choices made by a single chooser, 
the first choice is about which car to buy and the second choice is over a 
range of shoes. We cannot claim to know which one of these choices 
was more efficient solely based on the observation of exchange. To be 
sure, the chooser does not know it either - in the consequential sense, 
that is. The beautiful car she just bought may turn out to be a 
catastrophe while the shoes she bought in the sales may serve her well 
for years to come.  
Properly understood, the constitutional criterion of goodness is 
only concerned with the realisation of the members’ interests at the 
moment of choice. The constitutional perspective does not pretend to have 
foresight into the degree of consistency between expectations and 
outcomes that eventually unfold. That is why entering a firm at t0 point 
in time and entering into another at t1 point in time deserve equal 
procedural efficiency. As soon as the agent enters the new firm at t1 it 
may become clear that the previous firm was the better alternative. But 
to know this requires accumulation of knowledge that was not there 
before t1.  
 
Incomplete contracting 
 
Incomplete contracting theories break with the Arrow-Debreu 
assumption of complete contracting. It strikes one as being rather 
realistic to assume that individuals do not know all the future 
contingencies which may affect the carrying out of a contract of any 
complexity or time span. Despite this, both the nexus of contract 
approach and the formal principal-agent theory are largely based on the 
assumption of complete contracting (Foss 1999).  
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Coordination is one of the themes around which the incomplete 
contracting approach rotates, beginning already with Coase’s (1937) 
seminal contribution. Wernerfelt (1997), for example, argues that the 
firm exists because of its advantage in minimising communication costs in 
intrafirm relations. Herbert Simon (1951) emphasises the distinction 
between the employment contract and the market contract. This 
perspective contradicts another contractual idea, developed by Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972), that intrafirm contracts cannot be distinguished 
from market contracts. Their analysis implies that the firm is reduced to 
a fictitious legal entity. The constitutional perspective is founded on the 
recognition that intrafirm relations are essentially different from market 
relations. They are different enough to make the concept of concerted 
action operational within the firm (Vanberg 1994, 135). It is precisely the 
cooperative team dynamics, which are not decomposable into bilateral 
agreements among the members, that make intrafirm relations different 
from the market ones (see also, Coleman 1990). Simon (1951) argues 
that the advantage of the employment relationship over the market 
contract lies in its flexibility. After the employee has submitted to the 
governance structure of the firm, her action can be adapted more fully to 
unforeseen future contingencies.  
Asset specificity is another theme in incomplete contracting. Unlike 
the coordination approach, the asset specificity perspective highlights the 
organisational implications of ex post opportunism when relation-specific 
investments are involved (Foss 1999, 25). Williamson (1971, 1991) and 
his followers extensively discuss the implications of opportunism combined 
with Simon’s concept of bounded rationality on different types of economic 
organisation. This approach resonates with the constitutional perspective 
of Gifford (1991).  
Contracts of any complexity or time span remain imperfect. This is 
due to our ignorance about how future events will affect what is agreed 
upon. Despite this anomaly, the parties can agree as new events disclose 
that certain implicit terms are binding which thus help in mending the 
initial contract. In order for the implicit terms to be effective, the parties 
must share their meaning. Otherwise the agreement breaks down. In 
order to secure agreement the parties submit to conventions that bring 
coherence to their interpretations of implicit terms. This is to say that an 
underlying reason for a successful application of implicit terms and 
contracts can be found in conventions. 
 
Spontaneous elements 
 
The constitutional perspective of the present paper differs to some 
extent from that of contractarian philosophy as defined in Brennan and 
Buchanan (1985). The present approach takes into account, not only 
explicit agreements among firm members but also conventions. The 
perspective is related to approaches that emphasise the plurality and 
complexity of the relations within organisations. For instance, Herbert 
Simon states that 
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To many persons, an organization is something that is drawn 
on charts or recorded in elaborate manuals of job descriptions. … In 
this book, the term organization refers to the complex pattern of 
communication and relationships in a group of human beings. This 
pattern provides to each member of the group a … set of stable and 
comprehensible expectations as to what the other members of the 
group are doing and how they will react to what he says and does. 
(Simon 1976, introduction to the third edition, as referred in Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy 1997) 
 
A number of writers within related perspectives share the 
understanding that implicit contracts and spontaneous procedures are 
essential components of organisational dynamics (see, e.g., Barnard 1938, 
Simon 1976, Granovetter 1985). The present study shares Barnard’s view 
that many of the rules and practises are organisation-specific: 
 
[Consider] the lines of organization, the governing policies, the 
rules and regulations, the patterns of behavior of a specific 
organization. Though much of this is recorded in writing in any 
organization and can be studied, much is “unwritten law” and can 
chiefly be learned by intimate observation and experience. (Barnard 
1976) 
 
The present perspective is also related to Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy’s (1997) analysis of implicit contracts. They emphasise the role 
of management in ‘the articulation of unwritten rules and codes of 
conduct, the development and maintenance of a reputation for abiding 
by these rules, and the use of subjective assessments and informal 
adaptation to events in the implementation of these rules’ (p. 23). The 
present approach deviates from theirs in that the emphasis is on the role 
of conventions as constitutional constraints. The creation of implicit 
contracts is therefore not seen as being as ‘conflict-laden’ a process as 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy suggest. Kreps’ (1990) emphasis on the role 
of corporate culture gives some insight into these matters.  
 
Corporate culture 
 
Kreps’ (1990) analysis of corporate culture discusses the realm that 
should reasonably be related to spontaneous processes within 
organisations. In Kreps’ terms, corporate culture consists of ‘the 
interrelated principles’ that the organisation applies and ‘the means by 
which the principle is communicated’ to say ‘how things are done, and 
how they are meant to be done in the organization’. Because corporate 
culture is ‘designed through time to meet unforeseen future 
contingencies as they arise, it will be the product of evolution inside the 
organization…’. (p. 93-4) Corporate culture does not only consist of the 
basic principles, but plays a role ’by establishing general principles that 
should be applied’ (p. 126). This may be taken to be related to the 
evolutionary idea that once a convention has been established, it 
becomes a reference point for future development.  
The reason why the employees of a firm have reason to expect 
authority to be used fairly is their expectation that reputation is considered 
a valuable asset (p. 92). I would suggest that reputation alone does not 
ensure fairness in adapting to unforeseen future contingencies. We need 
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something that links reputation to new situations. That link is suggested 
to be in the form of conventions that provide shared interpretation of 
fairness and also a potential to establish shared reference-points for new 
events as they disclose themselves.  
The present approach deviates from Kreps’ analysis in that it does 
not assume any single and rigid focal principle (p. 130). When discussing 
the optimal size of an organisation, Kreps assumes that a corporate 
culture faces problems when the span of the principle is increased (p. 
129). This is because the range of contingencies that the principle must 
cover must also increase. The applicability of the principle (or culture or 
contract in Kreps’ terminology) becomes ambiguous when increasingly 
dissimilar contingencies are introduced (p. 130). A potential reason for 
this interpretation may be the disregard of rules in shaping 
interpretations of new contingencies. The essence of any rule is that it 
applies to a range of dissimilar events but what is equally important is 
that our perception of inexperienced events is based on our capacity to 
perceive them through categories of events, not as unique events as such 
(Hayek 1952). This alleviates the claim that when there is a gradual 
expansion of contingencies (organic growth of the firm) the rule 
necessarily becomes increasingly ambiguous. The relative rate of change 
between the categories of contingencies and the rule itself then becomes 
the key issue. External shocks aside, there is no a priori reason to assume 
that the change in a rule could not correspond with the changes in 
categories. 
In Kreps’ analysis, corporate culture seems to obtain a rather rigid 
interpretation. The situation is not alleviated by the use of 
interchangeable terms: focal principle, implicit contract and corporate 
culture (p. 130). If we assume only one focal principle or implicit 
contract applied in an organisation, there is reason to believe that, be it 
however clear and prominent, it does not provide much behavioural 
guidance in unforeseen future contingencies. But if we assume that there 
are several principles, and perhaps conventions, things change. For 
Kreps, this is not a solution, though, as he claims that a wider range of 
principles ‘may increase ambiguity about how any single contingency 
should be handled’ (ibid.). The reason for Kreps’ doubt may be found in 
his general approach to corporate culture as being constructed by 
purposeful design. From the constructivist perspective the working 
properties of new principles are always uncertain and may only confuse 
the members of an organisation. My suggestion should at this point be 
rather obvious. I view corporate culture as being constituted by a system 
of conventions as well as designed principles. Conventions facilitate a 
wider range of principles without necessarily increasing ambiguity in 
interpreting unfolding contingencies. On the contrary, a central aspect of 
rules is that they shape our interpretations of dissimilar events. Even in 
the purest form of situational analysis, where we negotiate a situation 
which we have no previous experience of, we try to form a solution by 
referring to elements that bear some resemblance to our existing 
categories of recurrent patterns. This dynamic is often overlooked 
resulting in an unwarranted picture of our choice processes as being 
distant to rule following as a behavioural disposition.  
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In my terminology, corporate culture would be closer to the 
notion of the organisation’s spontaneous order, which, although it partly 
results from rules and principles of designed origin, should not be taken 
as fully designed. In this reconstruction, conventions play a role as well 
as explicitly agreed rules do in creating corporate culture.  
Another difficulty arises in Kreps’ analysis because of its static 
nature. Kreps states that ‘efficiency can be increased by monitoring 
adherence to the principle (culture). Violation of the culture generates 
direct negative externalities insofar as it weakens the organization’s 
overall reputation.’ (p. 126) In Kreps’ treatment, corporate culture is 
(nearly) tangible. It seems to be easy to observe when it is strengthened, 
as well as when it is weakened. Both violations of the culture and their 
consequences seem to be readily measurable. Insofar as we remain in 
static analysis, corporate culture remains unaltered when all the parties 
follow it. Kreps claims that ‘[r]ewarding good outcomes that involve 
violations of the culture generates negative externalities [because it] 
weakens individual incentives to follow the principle and thus increases 
(potentially) the costs of monitoring and control’ (ibid.). The static 
perspective of Kreps’ analysis makes changes in corporate culture 
unfeasible. Any experimental activity is a priori announced detrimental.  
In the present approach, experimental activity is central to the 
notion of change in human and social affairs. Although conventions may 
be unresponsive to situational variations, they will not remain unaltered. 
Even technological standards, which may, for a period of time, preclude 
alternative arrangements from emerging, will eventually give way to 
something new (see, e.g., Constant 1980). In order for a convention to 
change spontaneously, somebody may initiate change by violating the 
existing convention. The violation does not have to be dramatic in the 
sense that it may still be based on some other convention, such as 
general reciprocity, and receive its justification from that. Also, existing 
conventions may promote the emergence of new alternatives.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The broad goal of the paper has been to promote an 
understanding of the linkage between rational constructivist and 
spontaneous elements in the business firm’s constitutional dynamics. 
Business firms as voluntary organisations embody much of the same 
dynamics as larger organisations such as nation states. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the interrelations among the members of business 
firms are distinguishable in many aspects from those among the 
members of a nation state. The broadly defined constitutional 
perspective can provide an explanation for institutional change within 
firms without introducing non-individualistically definable efficiency 
criteria, or without assuming away the subjective elements by referring to 
natural selection.  
A central reason for my attempt to extend the constitutional 
approach to the firm by conventions is based on logic of reasoning. An 
analogy between a voluntary market exchange and a voluntary exchange 
of commitments in agreement upon a common rule is found 
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problematic because the efficiency consideration of the latter involves 
the rule that is yet to be agreed upon. A market exchange can be viewed 
as efficient within the rules that are already in place, whereas efficiency 
of an exchange that itself produces a shared rule cannot be derived from 
the exchange itself. Therefore, connecting a social contract with the 
conventions which define the shared understanding of the boundary 
between acceptable and unacceptable helps us to understand where the 
source of efficiency of an exchange upon shared rules is located.  
The types of constitutional approaches to the firm, as represented 
in Gifford (1991) and Furubotn (1988) are seen slightly problematic. 
Gifford’s treatment assumes epistemic capabilities from the part of the 
manager when designing an efficient constitution that may fall short in real 
life contexts. The present approach is equally sceptical about Furubotn’s 
idea that a firm’s constitution is a device by which profit maximisation 
per se is secured. It is maintained here that a social contract can only 
secure that the mutual interests of the participants are recognised at the 
moment of choice. Whatever consequences such a contract will produce as the 
future discloses are beyond the epistemic limitations of the participants.  
The contractarian principles are essentially about the means, not 
about the ends, by which a collective endeavour is to be pursued if the 
individual is taken as the ultimate source of valuation. The normative 
content of constitutional philosophy does not carry from this normative 
individualist position to consequential assessment of utilities that are not 
present when a choice is made. The paper has discussed some central 
complications that such a position necessarily brings along. Shared 
understanding of appropriate modes of behaviour in the form of 
conventions is proposed to help us in understanding the interplay 
between evolution and design in the constitutional dynamics of business 
firms.  
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